Abstract-We present an approach for the algorithmic computation of causalities in system models that we refer to as causality checking. We are basing our notion of causality on counterfactual reasoning, in particular using the structural equation model approach proposed in [1] that has been extended to reasoning about computational models in [2] . In this paper we present a search-based on-the-fly approach that nicely integrates into finite state verification techniques, such as explicit-state model checking [3] . We demonstrate the applicability of our approach using an industrial case study.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing complexity of modern safety-critical systems, the need for model based engineering methods that both help in architecting such systems and to asses their safety and correctness becomes increasingly obvious. Due to the size of the systems traditional techniques like reviews [4] and testing, on the one hand, and manual fault tree analysis [5] or failure mode and effect analysis [6] on the other hand, can only be applied to limited parts of the system. The main reason for this limitation lies in the vast amount of time and resources that is consumed by manually executing those techniques. In order to be able to asses the correctness and safety of these systems in a comprehensive manner automated or, at least, computer-aided techniques are needed.
Model Checking [3] , [7] is an established technique for the automated analysis of system properties. If a model of the system and a formalized property is given to the model checker, it automatically checks whether it can find property violations. In case the property is violated, the model checker returns a counterexample, which consists of a system execution trace leading to the property violation. While a counterexample helps in retracing the system execution leading to the property violation, it does not identify causes of the property violation.
In this paper we leverage the benefit gained from analyzing large number of counterexamples for a given property. We are thus able to identify commonalities among them and might hence be able to gain insight into what combination of events may have caused the property violation. We present an approach based on explicit state-space search towards the automated computation of causalities that we refer to as causality checking. Instead of returning just a single counterexamples at the end of the model checking process, we compute causal events that lead to the violation of a desired system property. The notion of causality that we use is based on counterfactual reasoning [1] , [8] .
In precursory work [2] we have presented an approach towards an adoption of the counterfactual reasoning model that we use as well as a mapping of the causality relationships to fault trees. In the precursory paper causality computation was performed as a post-processing step on a set of probabilistic counterexamples. For the off-line causality computation described in [2] all possible execution traces need to be computed and stored on disk prior to the causality checking. The current paper focuses on a extension of our causality model and an integration of the causality computation into standard state-space search as used by explicit-state model checkers. Consequently, it is no longer necessary to store all good and bad execution traces before performing the causality computation. We tailor the causality model for the use with concurrent system models described by transition systems and show how the causality checks can be mapped to suband super-set comparisons of execution traces. The proposed algorithm for causality checking is an extension of the depthfirst search and breadth-first search algorithms used for statespace exploration in explicit-state model checking. In keeping with standard practice in this domain we design our algorithms to work on-the-fly. To his end we propose a data-structure called sub-set graph that is used to store the counterexamples that are needed for causality checking. A further contribution of our current paper is an application of this approach to two case studies, one of them of industrial size, and a comparison of various search strategies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II we discuss how causality relationships can be formally established within system models. The on-the-fly algorithm for causality computation and how it is integrated in state-space exploration algorithms is presented in Section III.
In Section IV we demonstrate the causality checking approach using two case studies. Related work is discussed throughout the paper and in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
II. CAUSALITY REASONING IN SYSTEM MODELS
Our goal is to identify the events that cause the violation of a functional safety requirement. Such a violation could, for instance, represent a hazard or a potentially unsafe state of the system. We use the explicit state model checker SPIN [9] to check whether there are system executions that lead to such an undesired state. Before we explain in Section II-B how causality checking can be performed on system executions, we give the underlying formalization of the system model.
A. System Model
The systems that we wish to apply causality checking are are concurrent systems. For the formalization of the system model we follow the formalization of a model for concurrent computing systems proposed in [7] . The system model is given by a Transition System which is defined as follows:
Definition 1: Transition System. A transition system TS is a tuple (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) where S is a set of states, Act is a set of actions, → ⊆ S ×Act×S is a transition relation, I ⊆ S is a set of initial states, AP is a set of atomic propositions, and L ∶ S → 2 AP is a labeling function.
A Transition System defines a Kripke structure. Each state s ∈ S is labeled with the set L(s) of all atomic state propositions that are true in this state. The sets S and Act are either finite or countably infinite. The set Act contains all actions that can trigger the system to transit from some state into a successor state.
The execution semantics of a transition system is defined as follows:
Definition 2: Execution Trace of a Transition System. Let T = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) be a transition system. A finite execution σ of T is an alternating sequence of states s ∈ S and actions α ∈ Act ending with a state.
The analysis aims at identifying the violation of functional safety requirements. Such a violation is also referred to as a hazard. We use linear time temporal logic (LTL) using its standard syntax and semantics as defined in [10] in order to specify hazards. Hazards imply the reachability of unsafe states and they hence belong to the class of reachability properties. They fall within the class of safety properties in the commonly used topological classification scheme of safety and liveness properties.
We can partition the set of all possible execution traces Σ of a transition system T into the set of "good" execution traces, denoted Σ G , that do not witness a violation of the LTL formula representing the hazard, and the set of "bad" execution traces, denoted Σ B , that do witness a violation of the hazard. The traces in the set of "bad" executions are also referred to as counterexamples in model checking.
Definition 3: Good and Bad Execution Traces. Let T = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) be a transition system, let ϕ an LTL formula over AP and Σ that set of all possible finite executions of T. The set Σ is divided into into the set of "good" execution traces Σ G and in the set of "bad"-execution traces Σ B as follows:
We now have given the underlying definitions for our causality reasoning algorithm and will formally define our notion of causality for system models in the next section.
B. Causality Reasoning
In the philosophy of science, a commonly adopted notion of causality is that of counterfactual reasoning and the related alternative world semantics of Lewis [8] , [11] . In software and systems engineering, the counterfactual argument is frequently used as the foundation for identifying faults in program debugging [12] , [13] . The "naive" counterfactual causality criterion according to Lewis is as follows: event A is causal for the occurrence of event B if and only if, were A not to happen, B would not occur. The testing of this condition hinges upon the availability of alternative worlds. A causality can be inferred if there is a world in which A and B occur, whereas in an alternative world neither A nor B occurs. In our setting possible system execution traces represent the alternative worlds.
In our precursory paper [2] we present an adaption of the structural equation model (SEM) by Halpern and Pearl [1] to the causality analysis of model checking counterexamples. We use the adapted SEM in order to compute causal events out of sets of counterexamples. The underlying SEM extends the counterfactual reasoning approach by Lewis and encompasses the notion of causes being logical combinations of events as well as a distinction of relevant and irrelevant causes. In our precursory work, we extended the SEM by considering the order of the occurrences of events as possible causal factors. This extensions allows the application of this adapted causality model to a State-Action Trace Model (SATM).
We present here an amended version of the event order logic defined in [2] and further refine it in order to enable causality reasoning for concurrent system models specified by transition systems. Our goal is to automatically identify those events that are causal for the violation of an LTL property. We assume that for a given execution trace σ of a transition system T , Act contains the events that we wish to reason about. For an LTL formula ϕ specifying a safety requirement and an execution trace σ, the hazard described by the safety requirement occurs on σ if and only if σ ⊧ ϕ holds. Notice that since each transition is only labeled with one action, only one event can occur per transition. We also assume that there exists a set A of event variables that contains a boolean variable for each action α ∈ Act. The event variables are needed to formally express the occurrence of events in event order logic formulas. Notice that we consider event instances, not types. In other words, the i-th occurrence of some action of type α will be represented by a distinct boolean variable from the i+1st occurrence of this event type. We denote the variable that is representing the event α i ∈ Act by a αi .
Definition 4: Events, Event Types and Event Variables. Let T = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) a transition system and σ = s 0 , α 1 , s 1 , α 2 , . . . α n , s n a finite execution trace of T. We define the following: is denoted by a αi .
• The set A = {a α1 , ..., a αn } contains a boolean variable for each occurrence of an event. The event order logic allows to connect event variables from A with the boolean connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬. To express the ordering of events we introduce the ordered conjunction operator . The formula a a with a, b ∈ A is satisfied if and only if events a and b occur in a trace and a occurs before b. In addition to the operator we introduce the interval operators [ , ] , and < φ > , which define an interval in which an event has to hold in all states.
Definition 5: Syntax of Event Order Logic. Simple event order logic formulas over the set A of event variables are formed according to the following grammar given in BNF like syntax rules:
where a ∈ A and φ, φ 1 and φ 2 are simple event order logic formulas. Complex event order logic formulas are formed according to the following grammar given in BNF like syntax rules:
where φ is a simple event order logic formula.
The formal semantics of this logic is defined on execution traces. Notice that the , [ , ] , and < φ > operators are temporal logic operators and that the execution trace σ is akin to a linearly ordered Kripke structure.
Definition 6: Semantics of Event Order Logic. Let T = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) a transition system, and φ, φ 1 , φ 2 simple event order logic formulas and ψ, ψ 1 , ψ 2 complex event order logic formulas, and let A a set of event variables, with a αi ∈ A, over which φ, φ 1 , φ 2 are built. Let σ = s 0 , α 1 , s 1 , α 2 , . . . α n , s n a finite execution trace of T. We define that an event order logic formula is satisfied in a state s i of σ, written s i ⊧ ψ, as follows:
We define that an execution trace σ satisfies a formula ψ, written as σ ⊧ ψ iff ∃i . s i ⊧ ψ. We define that the transition system T satisfies the formula ψ, written as T ⊧ ψ, iff ∃σ ∈ T . σ ⊧ ψ.
We also investigated the usage of the interval logics [14] and [15] instead of the event order logic. While those interval logics are very expressive, they are to complex for our use case and hence we use the simpler event order logic.
Each execution trace σ specifies an assignment of the boolean values true and false to the variables in the set A. If an event α i occurs on σ its value is set to true. If the event does not occur on σ its value is set to false, respectively. We define a function val A (σ) that represents the valuation of all variables in A for a given σ.
Definition 7: Valuation of the Set of Event Variables. Let T = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) a transition system, σ = s 0 , α 1 , s 1 , α 2 , . . . α n , s n a finite execution trace of T and A the set of event variables then we define the function val A (σ) as follows:
Further we define val A (σ) = val A (σ ′ ) if for all a αi ∈ A the values assigned by val A (σ) and val A (σ ′ ) are equal and val A (σ) ≠ val A (σ ′ ) else. We partition the set of event variables A into sets Z and W . The events represented by the variables in Z are those events that are considered to be part of the causal process.
Definition 8: Causal Process [1] . The causal process comprises the causal events for the effect and all events that mediate between the causal events and the effect. Those variables which are not root causes, are needed to propagate the cause through the system until the final effect is being triggered.
We can use an event order logic formula ψ over the variables in Z to define the order and occurrence of events on a causal process.
Definition 9: Event Order Logic over Executions. Let T = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) a transition system, and σ = s 0 α 1 s 1 α 2 ... α n s n an execution trace of T. The event order logic over the execution σ denoted by ψ σ is defined as follows: We partition the set of event variables A into sets Z and W in such a way that Z contains all event variables of the events that occur on σ and W contains all event variables of the events that do not occur on σ. ψ σ is the event order logic formula containing all events in Z in the order they occur on σ (e.g. ψ σ = a α1 a α2 ... a αn ).
We now present an adaption of the SEM that can be used to decide whether a given ψ describes the causal process of a property violation in a transition system. If ψ describes the causal process of a property violation we also say ψ is causal for the property violation.
Definition 10: Cause for a Property Violation. Let T = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) a transition system, and σ, σ ′ and σ ′′ execution traces of T. We partition the set of event variables A into sets Z and W . An event order logic formula ψ consisting of the event variables in Z is considered a cause for an effect represented by the violation of the LTL formula ϕ, if the following conditions are satisfied:
• AC1: There exists an execution σ, for which both σ ⊧ ψ and σ ⊧ ϕ hold.
) and σ ′ ⊧ ϕ. In words, there exists an execution σ ′ where the order and occurrence of events is different from execution σ and ϕ is not violated on σ ′ .
• AC2 (2):
) it holds that σ ′′ ⊧ ϕ for all subsets of W . In words, for all executions where the events in Z have the value defined by val Z (σ) and the order defined by ψ, the value and order of an arbitrary subset of the events in W have no effect on the violation of ϕ.
• AC3: The event order logic formula ψ is minimal: no subset of ψ satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2. If AC1 and AC2(1) are fulfilled but AC2(2) fails for a event order logic formula ψ σ representing the events occurring on an execution trace σ this means that at least one event α occurs on σ ′′ which did not occur on σ and the occurrence of α prevents the property violation. Hence, we need to reflect the causality of the non-occurrence of α in ψ σ . For the models that we analyze there are three possibilities for such a preventing event α to occur, namely 1) at the beginning of the execution trace, 2) at the end of the execution trace, or 3) between two other events α 1 and α 2 . It is possible that the property violation is prevented by more than one event, hence we need to find the minimal set of events that are needed to prevent the property violation. This is achieved by finding the minimal true sub-set Q ⊂ W of event variables that need to be changed in order to prevent the property violation.
Definition 11: Non-Occurrence of Events. Let T = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) a transition system, and σ and σ ′′ execution traces of T. We partition the set of event variables A into sets Z and W . Let ψ a event order logic formula consisting of the event variables in Z. The non-occurrence of the events which are represented by the event variables a α ∈ Q with Q ⊂ W on execution σ is causal for the violation of the LTL formula ϕ if the following is satisfied:
• ψ satisfies AC1 and AC2(1) but violates AC2 (2) • Q is minimal: There is no true subset of Q for which
For each event variable a α ∈ Q we determine the location of the event in ψ ′′ and prohibit the occurrence of α in the same location in ψ. We add ¬a α ] at the beginning of ψ if the event occurred at the beginning of σ ′′ and [ ¬a α at the end of ψ if the event occurred at the end of σ ′′ . If α occurred between the two events α 1 and α 2 we insert < ¬a α > between the two event variables a α1 and a α2 in ψ. Additionally, each event variable in Q is added to Z. After ψ was modified the conditions AC1, AC2(1), AC2(2) and AC3 are checked for the modified ψ.
If a formula ψ meets conditions AC1 through AC3, the occurrence of the events included in ψ is causal for the violation of ϕ. However, condition AC2 does not imply that the order of the occurring events is causal. If the order of the events is not causal, then there has to exist an execution for each ordering of the events that is possible in the system, and these executions all violate the property.
Definition 12: Order Condition (OC1). Let T = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) a transition system, and σ, σ ′ execution traces of T. Let ψ an event order logic formula over Z that holds for σ and let ψ ∧ the event order logic formula that is created by replacing all -operators in ψ by ∧-operators. The [ , ] , and
The order of a sub-set of events Y ⊆ Z represented by the event order logic formula χ is not causal if the following holds:
We will now illustrate the introduced definitions by the application to a running example.
C. Running Example
In the running example of a railroad crossing system that we will use in this paper, a train can approach the crossing (Ta), cross the crossing (Tc) and finally leave the crossing (Tl). Whenever a train is approaching, the gate should close (Gc) and will open when the train has left the crossing (Go). It might also be the case that the gate fails (Gf). The car approaches the crossing (Ca) and crosses the crossing (Cc) if the gate is open and finally leaves the crossing (Cl). We are interested in finding those events that lead to a hazard state in which both the car and the train are in the crossing. This hazard can be characterized by the LTL formula ϕ = 2¬(car crossing ∧ train crossing).
In the following we will use short-hand notation σ = "a α1 ,a α2 , ... , a αn " for an execution trace σ = s 0 α 1 s 1 α 2 ... α n s n .
Suppose we want to check whether the events on the execution trace σ = "Ta, Ca, Gf, Cc, Tc" are causal for the violation of ϕ. We partition the set A of event variables in the set Z containing all the event variables of the events that occur on σ and the set W containing all the event variables of the events that do not occur on σ. The resulting event order logic formula over Z, that we want to show is causal, is ψ = Ta Ca Gf Cc Tc. Now we need to show that AC1, AC2(1), AC2(2) and AC3 are fulfilled for ψ.
• AC1 is fulfilled, since there exists an execution σ = "Ta, Ca, Gf, Cc, Tc" for which σ ⊧ ψ, and both the train and the car are in the crossing at the same time.
• AC2(1) is fulfilled since there exists an execution σ ′ = "Ta, Ca, Gc, Tc" for which
) holds and σ ′ does not violate the property.
• Now we need to check the condition AC2 (2) . For the execution σ ′′ ="Ta, Ca, Gf, Cc, Cl, Tc" and the partition
Since the car leaves the crossing (Cl) before the train enters the crossing (Tc) the property is not violated. Hence AC2 (2) is not fulfilled by ψ. Cl is the only event that can preempt the property violation on σ and occurs between the events Cc and T c. Consequently ¬Cl is added to Z and ψ, we hence get ψ = Ta Ca Gf Cc < ¬Cl > Tc.
• In our model there does not exist an event order logic formula that is a subset of ψ and satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2,. As a consequence, AC3 is fulfilled.
Finally we need to check the order of events is causal with OC1. In our example, the order of the events Gf, Cc, ¬Cl, Tc is causal since only if the gate fails before the car and the train are entering the crossing, and the car does not leave the crossing before the train is entering the crossing an accident happens.
III. ON-THE-FLY CAUSALITY CHECKING

A. Preliminaries
In order to compute causality relationships, it is necessary to compute good and bad execution traces. If depth-first search or breadth-first search is used for model checking, good and bad executions can easily be retrieved by the counterexample reporting capabilities of the model checker in use. Note that we want to analyze reachability properties and hence only need to consider finite execution fragments [7] . The good and bad execution traces are defined according to Def. 3. Bad executions are all those executions where a property violation is detected and good executions are all those executions where no property violation can be observed along the trace.
The key idea of the proposed algorithm is that the conditions AC1, AC2(1,) AC2(2) and AC3 defined in Section II can be mapped to computing sub-and super-set relationships between good and bad execution traces. In the following we also use the terms sub-execution and super-executions to refer to sub-or super-set relationships between different execution traces. In order to establish sub-and super-set relationships between execution traces we define a number of execution trace comparison operators.
Definition 13: Execution Trace Comparison Operators. Let T = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) a transition system, and σ 1 and σ 2 execution traces of T.
=:
The conditions AC1, AC2, and AC3 can be mapped to computing sub-and super-set relationships between different execution traces. In the following let ϕ a safety property in LTL, σ, σ ′ , σ ′′ , σ ′′′ execution traces and ψ σ , ψ σ ′ , ψ σ ′′ , ψ σ ′′′ the event order logic formulas representing these execution traces, respectively.
Theorem 1: AC1 is fulfilled for all ψ σ where σ ∈ Σ B . Proof: For each σ ∈ Σ B we can partition the set A of event variables into the sets Z and W such that Z consists of the variables of the events that occur on σ and ψ σ consists of the variables in Z. Consequently, σ ⊧ ψ σ and σ ⊧ ϕ because σ is a bad execution. Therefore, AC1 is fulfilled for all ψ σ where σ ∈ Σ B .
Theorem
Proof: To show AC2(1) for a execution σ we need to show that there exists an execution σ ′ for which
′′ which is the case if σ⊆σ ′′ holds. The set W contains the event variables of the events that did not occur on σ and val σ (W ) assigns false to all event variables in W . For val σ ′′ (W ) to be different from val σ (W ) there has to be at least one event variable that is set to true by val σ ′′ (W ). This is only the case if an event that does not occur on σ occurs on σ ′′ . Consequently, σ ′′ consists of all events that did occur on σ and at least one event that did not occur on σ which is true if σ⊂σ ′′ holds. σ ′′ ⊧ ϕ holds if σ ′′ ∈ Σ B and is false if σ ′′ ∈ Σ G . Hence, AC2(2) holds for σ if there is no σ ′′ ∈ Σ G for which σ⊂σ ′′ holds.
Theorem 4: AC(3) holds for ψ σ if there does not exists an execution σ ′′′ ∈ Σ B for which σ ′′′ ⊂ σ holds.
Proof: In AC(3) we have to show that no subset of the event order logic formula ψ satisfies AC1, AC2(1) and AC2 (2) . Suppose there exists a σ ′′′ ∈ Σ B with σ ′′′ ⊂ σ. We can partition A in Z σ ′′′ andW σ ′′′ such that Z σ ′′′ consists of the variables of the events that occur on σ ′′′ and ψ σ ′′′ consists of the variables in Z σ ′′′ . For σ we partition A in Z σ andW σ such that Z σ consists of the variables of the events that occur on σ and ψ σ consists of the variables in Z σ . Consequently, Z σ ′′′ ⊂ Z σ and ψ σ ′′′ ⊂ ψ σ . If ψ σ ′′′ satisfies AC1, AC2(1), AC2(2), then AC3 would be violated. If we can not find a σ ′′′ with σ ′′′ ⊂ σ, then no subset of ψ σ satisfies AC1, AC2(1) and AC2(2), and consequently AC3 holds.
We have shown how inferring causality in this model based setting can be seen as the problem of finding sub-or superexecutions and determining whether the found executions are in the set of bad-or good-executions. We use these theorems in order to devise an algorithm and a corresponding datastructure called sub-set graph (Section III-B) for on-the-fly causality checking with breadth-first (Section III-D) and depthfirst search (Section III-E). 
B. Sub-Set Graph Data-Structure
For the storage of the execution traces we have devised a data-structure called sub-set graph. This data-structure enables us to make causality decisions on-the-fly which means that we can decide whether an execution trace is causal as soon as we add it to the sub-set graph. The sub-set graph is structured into levels where each level corresponds to the length of the execution traces on that level. Each node represents exactly one execution trace. Figure 1 shows a part of the sub-set graph for the railroad crossing example. The execution traces on adjoining levels are connected by edges indicating subset relationships between the respective execution traces. In order to improve readability the edges between executions on the same level are not displayed in the figure. The nodes representing the execution traces are colored in green, red, black or orange in order to indicate their potential causality relation according to the following rules: 1) A node is colored green if it represents a good execution trace and all nodes on the level below that are connected with it are also colored green. An example of such a trace "Ca,Ta,Gc,Tc,Tl" in the railroad crossing example. Green traces can not be causal because they are good traces. The green traces can be prefixes of either bad or good execution traces. 2) A node is colored red if it represents a bad execution trace and all nodes on the level below that are connected with it are colored green. Red nodes correspond to the shortest bad traces found at any point of the statespace exploration. They are considered to be causal. As an example consider the trace "Ta,Ca,Gf,Cc,Tc" of our example. 3) A node is colored black if it represents a good execution trace, but at least one node on the level below that it is connected with is colored red. Black traces cannot be causal themselves, since they are good traces, but since a sub-trace of them with one less element is a minimal bad trace, the transition in the subset graph from red to black identifies an event that turns a bad execution into a good one. We hence take advantage of black traces when checking condition AC2(2). As an example for a black node consider the the trace "Ta,Ca,Gf,Cc,Cl,Tc" of the railroad crossing example, which is connected with the red execution "Ta,Ca,Gf,Cc,Tc" on the level below, the introduced "Cl" event turns the bad execution into a good one. 4) A node is colored orange if it represents a bad execution trace and at least one node on the level below that is connected to the orange node is colored red. If a trace is colored orange, there exists a shorter red trace on a level below and hence a orange trace does not fulfill the minimality constraint AC3 for being causal. An example for an orange colored trace is the trace "Ca,Ta,Gc,Tc,Tl,Go,Ta,Gf,Cc,Tc" which, due to space restrictions, is not depicted in Figure 1 . The trace "Ca,Ta,Gf,Cc,Tc" is a shorter red trace and a sub-set of the trace "Ca,Ta,Gc,Tc,Tl,Go,Ta,Gf,Cc,Tc", hence the trace does not fulfill the minimality constraint.
C. Causality Checking
The causality checking that we propose is embedded into both of the standard state-space exploration algorithms used in explicit state model checking, namely depth-first and breadthfirst search. Whenever a bad or a good execution is found by the search algorithm it is added to the subset graph. After adding a trace the algorithm first checks whether there are executions at the same level that consist of the same events but in a different order.
• If we find such an execution, then all sub-set relationships of the execution already in the sub-set graph hold also for the newly added execution. For instance in our example all sub-set relationships that hold for the execution "Ta,Ca,Gf,Cc,Tc" also hold for the execution "Ta,Gf,Ca,Cc,Tc".
• If we don't find such a trace on the same level, we have to check the sub-set relationships with the execution traces on the level below (level-1) and, if depth-first search is used, on the level above (level+1) as well. It is not necessary to check the sub-set relationships on the level above (level+1) if breadth-first search is used, because breadth-first search adds the traces by increasing length, hence there are not yet any traces on the level above. Once all sub-set relationships are established, the nodes representing the executions are colored according to the above described coloring rules. If a trace is colored red, we additionally need to check for sub-set relationships with all other traces that are colored red, since it might be the case that a shorter red trace exists on a lower level and was not continued because it ended in the bad state. If such a shorter red trace is found, the current trace is colored orange. In our example the execution traces Ta,Ca,Gf,Cc,Tc and Ta,Gf,Ca,Cc,Tc and Ca,Ta,Gf,Cc,Tc are colored red and hence considered to be causal.
The following theorems show that for an execution σ that is colored red ψ σ is a candidate for being causal and fulfills AC1, AC2(1) and AC3.
Theorem 5: AC1 is fulfilled for ψ σ of each execution trace σ that is colored red.
Proof: By definition an execution trace is only colored red if it is a bad trace and according to Theorem 1 AC1 is fulfilled for all σ ∈ Σ B .
Theorem 6: AC2 (1) is fulfilled for ψ σ of each execution trace σ that is colored red.
Proof: According to Theorem 2 we can show AC2(1) by finding an execution σ ′ ∈ Σ G for which σ ′ ⊂ σ holds. For an execution σ to be colored red, all sub execution traces on the level below have to be colored green. Consequently, for each execution σ ′ for which σ ′ ⊂ σ holds also σ ′ ∈ Σ G holds because it is colored green and hence needs to be a good trace. Therefore, AC2(1) is fulfilled according to Theorem 2.
Theorem 7: If breadth-first search is used, AC3 is fulfilled for ψ σ of each execution trace σ that is colored red. If depth-first search is used, AC3 is fulfilled for ψ σ of each execution trace σ that is colored red as soon as the state-space exploration has terminated.
Proof: According to Theorem 4 ψ fulfills AC3 if there does not exists a trace σ ′′′ ∈ Σ B for which σ ′′′ ⊂ σ holds. This is due to the fact that by definition an execution trace is only colored red if all its sub-sets are colored green, which means there is no bad sub-execution σ ′′′ of σ. If breadthfirst search is used the shortest paths are added first, hence all sub-executions are known at the time where σ is inserted and colored. Consequently, if breadth-first search is used, AC3 is fulfilled for ψ σ of each execution trace σ that is colored red. If depth-first search is used it is possible that new subexecutions are found as long as the state-space exploration is not completed. As a result, AC3 is fulfilled for ψ σ of each execution trace σ that is colored red as soon as the state-space exploration with depth-first search has terminated.
Once the state space search is completed we have to perform the tests for AC2 (2) and OC1 for all red execution traces.
According to Theorem 3, AC2(2) holds for ψ σ if there is no σ ′′ ∈ Σ G for which σ⊂σ ′′ holds. If such a σ ′′ exists, it is a black super-set of σ because σ ⊂ σ ′′ holds for each black super-set of σ and σ is only colored black if it is a good trace. Consequently, we need to check for each black superset σ ′′ of σ whether σ⊂σ ′′ holds. If there is no σ ′′ for which σ⊂σ ′′ holds ψ σ fulfills AC2(2). If σ⊂σ ′′ holds for a blacksuper set we need to modify ψ σ as specified by Definition 11. We have hence shown that AC1, AC2(1), AC2(2) and AC3 are fulfilled for ψ σ of each red execution σ and ψ σ is causal for the property violation.
The pseudo code for the AC2(2) test is shown in Figure  4 . Notice that the AC2(2) test is needed in order to detect whether the non-occurrence of an event is causal. Only to test AC2(2) we need to store all traces that are colored black, they would otherwise not have to be stored. Hence we have added a runtime switch in the implementation of the causality checking method that allows to turn the AC2(2) test off in order to save memory at the expense of not being able to take the possible causality of the non-occurrence of an event into account. If the AC2(2) test is fulfilled by ψ σ , then the OC1 test is performed. The pseudo code for the test of OC1 is shown in Figure 5 . Due to the structure of the sub-set graph, it is sufficient to check for each red execution trace whether there exists a red execution trace on the same level for which the unordered ⊆ relationship holds. For all those execution traces, we check for each pair of events whether they appear on all execution traces in the same order or not. If a pair of events does not occur in the same order, then the order of this pair is marked as having no influence on causality.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo code of the Sub-Set Graph data structure 
D. Causality Checking with Breadth-First Search (BFS)
The pseudo-code of the adapted breadth-first search algorithm is given in the Algorithm 6 figure. When using breadth-first search, the execution trace leading to a state can be generated by iterating through the predecessor states. Whenever a bad or a good execution is found it is added to the sub-set graph. If BFS encounters a state that is already in the state-space and hence all successors of this state have already been explored, the successors are not explored a second time. Since BFS explores the state-space following an exploration order that leads to a monotonically increasing length of the execution traces, this new execution trace reaching the state either has the same length as the already known execution trace containing the same state, or the new execution reaching the state is longer than the already known execution trace. If the new execution trace has the same length, the events on the trace have an order that is different from the one in the already known execution trace. Hence the new execution trace needs to be added to the sub-set graph since a later OC1 test needs to be performed on it.
E. Causality Checking with Depth-First Search (DFS)
We adapted the depth-first search algorithm typically used in checking reachability properties in explicit-state model checking to add an execution trace to the sub-set graph data structure whenever either a bad state is reached or a good execution trace has been found. If depth-first search is used it is sufficient to print the search stack in order to retrieve the execution trace. Similarly to BFS, if DFS encounters a duplicate, which is a state that is already in the state-space, and hence all successors of the duplicate have already been explored, the successors are not explored a second time. It is Algorithm 2 Algorithm sketch of the addTrace() method of the sub-set graph (part 1) addTrace(Trace t) { t.color = green; if(t.isBad()) { add(redTraces, t); t.color = red; } // add trace to its level add(levelToIDs, length(t), getID(t)); boolean subSetSearchNeeded = true; // same level check for OC 1 * / int level = length(t); for each t' in getTracesByLevel(level){ Trace tempTrace;
if(isSubSet( t', t)) { addSameLevelSuperSet(t', t) addSameLevelSubSet(t, t') //If t1 has sem length and is subset, //all subsets of t1 are subsets of t //subset search is not needed subSetSearchNeeded = false; t.SubSets = t'.SubSets possible that this new trace to the duplicate is shorter or has a different event order than the already known execution traces that contain the duplicate. Hence we store this new execution trace on a match list in the sub-set graph and generate all execution traces starting from the duplicate state with the new trace as a prefix.
F. Complexity
[16] contains a careful analysis of the complexity of computing causality in the SEM. Most notable is the result that even for an SEM with only binary variables, in the general case computing causal relationships between variables is NP-complete. Results in [17] show that causality can be computed in polynomial time if the causal graph over the Algorithm 5 Algorithm sketch of the checkOC1() method. variables which represent the events forms a directed causal tree. A directed causal tree consists of directed paths, that containing the variables representing the events, leading to the root node representing the hazard or effect. Each bad execution trace in the counterexample is a directed path containing the variables representing the events leading to the hazard or effect. Consequently, a set of counterexamples resembles a directed causal tree and our algorithm can compute the causal process in polynomial time.
IV. CASE STUDIES
A. Experiment Setup
In order to evaluate the proposed approach, we have implemented our causality checking algorithms within the SpinJa toolset [18] , a Java re-implementation of the explicit state model checker Spin [9] . Our SpinCause tool 1 computes the causality relationships for a Promela model and a given LTL reachability property. In order to compute all interleavings and all executions partial-order reduction was disabled during the state-space exploration. The following experiments were performed on a PC with an Intel Xeon Processor (3.60 Ghz) and 144 GBs RAM. Figure 2 shows the fault tree of the railway crossing example that was generated by our tool. All execution traces that are colored red are part of the fault tree representation. The fault trees generated by our approach all have a normal form, that is they start with an intermediate gate representing the top level event, that is connected to an OR gate. The execution traces that are colored red are represented by Priority-AND (PAND) gates if the order of events is causal or AND gates if the order is not causal. The events of the execution traces are connected to the corresponding AND gates or PAND gates. For better readability we have omitted the order constraints of the PAND-gates. There are two combinations of events, that cause a crash on the railway crossing:
• First, if a train (Ta) and a car (Ca) are approaching and the gate fails (Gf), this results in a hazardous situation if the car is on the crossing (Cc) and does not leave the crossing (Cl) before the train (Tc) enters the crossing (Ta Ca Gf Cc < ¬Cl > Tc).
• Second, if a train (Ta) and a car (Ca) are approaching but the gate closes (Gc) when the car (Cc) is already on the railway crossing and is not able to leave (Cl) before the gate is closing and the train is crossing (Tc), this also corresponds to a hazardous situation. (Ta Ca Cc < ¬Cl > Gc Tc). 
C. Airbag Control Unit
The industrial size model of an airbag system that we use in this case study is taken from [19] . The architecture of this system consists of two acceleration sensors, one microcontroller to perform the crash evaluation, and an actuator that controls the deployment of the airbag. Although airbags save lifes in crash situations, they may cause fatal accidents if they are inadvertently deployed. It is therefore a pivotal safety requirement that an airbag is never deployed if there is no crash situation. We are interested in computing the causal events for the hazard corresponding to an inadvertent ignition of the airbag. Notice that the Promela model was automatically synthesized, from a higher-level UML design model by the QuantUM tool [20] . Figure 3 shows the fault tree generated by the SpinCause tool. All execution traces that are colored red are part of the fault tree representation. The fault trees generated by our approach all have a normal form, that is they start with an intermediate gate representing the top level event, that is connected to an OR gate. The execution traces that are colored red are represented by Priority-AND (PAND) gates if the order of events is causal or AND gates if the order is not causal. The events of the execution traces are connected to the corresponding AND gates or PAND gates. For better readability we have omitted the order constraints of the PAND-gates. While there are a total of 20,300 bad execution traces, the fault tree comprises only 5 paths. Obviously, a manual analysis of this large number of traces in order to determine causal factors would be impossible. It is easy to see in the fault tree which basic events cause an inadvertent deployment of the airbag. For instance, there is only one single fault that can lead to an inadvertent deployment, namely FASICShortage. It is also easy to see that the combination of the basic events FETStuckHigh and FASICStuckHigh only lead to an inadvertent deployment of the airbag if the basic event FETStuckHigh occurs prior to the basic event FASICStuckHigh. The case study shows that the fault tree is a compact and concise visualization of the counterexample which allows for an easy identification of the basic events that cause the inadvertent deployment of the airbag. If the order of the events is important, this can be seen in the fault tree by the PAND gate.
D. Discussion Figure 4 shows the experimental results for both case studies. The following trends can be identified:
• If no causality checking is done, DFS and BFS have approximately the same runtime and memory consumption.
• When performing causality checking, BFS outperforms DFS in terms of both runtime and memory consumption. This is due to the fact that if BFS is used, the algorithm can rely on assumptions regarding the length of the execution traces, namely that BFS always finds shortest counterexamples. If a trace is added by BFS, the algorithm can rely on that all traces that will be added after the trace have equal or greater length. Consequently all execution traces that are added by BFS and colored red immediately fulfill the minimality condition AC3. When using DFS we can not make any assumptions on the length of the paths. It is possible that bad traces are colored red but later in the search a shorter bad trace is found. If the shorter bad trace is a sub-execution of the longer bad traces the minimality condition is violated for the longer traces. The longer traces would not have been considered to be causal if BFS would have been used. This effect becomes especially obvious in terms of memory consumption if we take the non-occurrence of events into account. If we want to check AC2(2) we have to store all good execution traces that are super-sets of bad execution traces. When using BFS we know for each trace all possible sub-traces and hence only have to store the black traces. If we use DFS we do not know all sub-traces, because we always might find a shorter trace later in the search, and hence have to store all good execution traces.
• Figure 5 shows the memory and run time consumption for model checking and causality checking if the approach presented in [2] Mem. MC) and the causality checking tool reads that file once the model checking is done and performs the causality checking off-line (Run. Caus. and Mem. Caus.). The on-line approach proposed in this paper outperforms the off-line approach both in terms of runtime and memory consumption. This is because we do not have to store all execution traces on disk during the model checking and read them back into memory for causality checking.
V. RELATED WORK
For the off-line causality computation described in [2] all good and bad execution traces need to be computed and stored on disk prior to the causality checking. In this paper we present an algorithm for causality computation along with a suitable data structure that can be integrated in an on-the-fly depth-first search or breadth-first search algorithm. Consequently it is no longer necessary to store all good and bad execution traces before performing the causality computation.
Work documented in [21] uses the Halpern and Pearl approach to explain counterexamples in functional CTL model checking by determining causality. However, this approach considers only functional counterexamples that consist of single execution sequences. Furthermore, it focuses on the causality of variable value-changes for the violation of CTL subformulas, whereas our approach identifies the events that lead to the variable value-changes. If for instance the CTL formula consists of only one boolean variable (e.g. airbag fired), it is obvious that changing the value of the variable is causal for the property violation. The approach in [21] merely identifies the variable value-change (e.g. setting airbag fired to true) as cause, whereas our approach identifies the events that caused the value-change (e.g. FETStuckHigh and FASICStuckHigh).
In [22] a formal framework for reasoning about contract violations is presented. In order to derive causality the notion of precedence established by Lamport clocks [23] is used. While this captures a partial order of the observed contract violations there is no evidence whether this partial order has an impact on causality or not. Work described in [13] establishes causality based on Lewis counterfactual reasoning by computing distance metrics between execution traces. The delta between the counterexample and the most similar good execution is identified as causal for the bad behavior. For all the above mentioned approaches it is necessary to compute the counterexamples prior to the causality analysis whereas our approach works on-the-fly. To the best of our knowledge we are not aware of any other causality checking algorithm that can be integrated with explicit state-space exploration algorithms and which works on-the-fly.
As an alternative to the event order logic that we defined we also investigated the usage of the interval logics [14] and [15] . We felt that in light of the relatively simple ordering constraints that we need to describe those logics are overtly expressive, and we hence decided to define our own tailored, relatively simple event order logic.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed how causality relationships can be established in system executions and have shown how the causality checks can be mapped to finding sub-and supersets of execution traces. Furthermore we have proposed an approach for causality computation that works on-the-fly and can be integrated into explicit state-space model checking algorithms. We have evaluated our approach on two case studies, one of which is of industrial size. The experimental evaluation indicates that breadth-first search outperforms depth-first search in terms of memory and runtime, which is due to the fact that assumptions on the length of the execution traces can be made if breadth-first search is used. In addition, the experimental evaluation also shows that the on-the-fly approach we presented here outperforms our precursory offline approach.
In future work we plan to embed causality checking into a symbolic reasoning environment in order to avoid the explicit storing of traces. In addition we plan to combine our work on causality checking for probabilistic models with the approach presented here.
